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This thesis is an attempt to define some key pragmatic 
concepts and to show how they can be used in the solution of 
a number of recurrent problems in the philosophy of language.
Chapter one examines two traditional approaches to the 
study of languages and reveals their apriori character. The 
eclectic view which evolves in the course of this examination 
provides the theoretical background for the investigation of 
contextual synonymy.
In Chapter two, preliminary definitions needed for the 
analysis of contexts are constructed. These definitions are 
then combined to define the notion of a significant conse­
quence of a sentence, and ultimately the notion of synonymy 
relative to a context.
Chapter three undertakes the application of the 
concept of contextual synonymy to some contemporary issues. 
Translation and the analysis of sentences of propositional 
attitude receive the primary emphasis, and suggestions are 
made concerning the semantic treatment of modal notions and 
practical applications in machine translation.
Chapter four includes a review of a number of currently 
unsolved problems, and concludes with a critical evaluation 
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Philosophy is by far the most explicitly verbal of 
the sciences. Language is the primary mode in which the 
philosopher expresses his ideas and verbal discussion is the 
laboratory, so to speak, in which those ideas are tested. 
But there is an important disanalogy between the situations 
of the scientist and the philosopher, in that, the basic 
principles governing the operation of the scientist’s 
equipment are comparatively well-understood whereas the 
basic principles governing the operation of language are not. 
The engineering student who knows how to use an oscilloscope 
without knowing how it works can make mistake after mistake 
without realizing that the fault lies with the machine. 
There is no telling how many philosophical blunders are 
committed and bequeathed to subsequent generations for much 
the same reason.
Thus it is perhaps not surprising that philosophers 
in the twentieth century have become increasingly inclined 
to turn from the contemplation of esoteric metaphysical 
questions to a critical evaluation of the extent to which 
the use, or misuse, of language contributes to the
1
generation and solution of philosophical puzzles. This 
project has itself proved quite formidable, and has produced 
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a bewildering variety of alternative theories. Although 
some progress has been made, there is still very little in 
the way of general agreement on some of the most Lundamental 
issues.I
Rather, writers on the philosophy of language are 
divided (very roughly) into a number of warring camps. There 
are Wittgensteinians, Austinians, Carnapians, Russelians, 
Fregeans, Quinlans and Skinnerians, to name a few, and 
dissenticn within each group is common. It would be worth­
while to consider just what is expected of an adequate 
theory of language, in order to understand this lack of 
consensus.
Most generally, the problem is to at -ount for the 
fluent speaker’s ability to readily produce and understand 
meaningful utterances of his language, including wholly novel 
ones, in terms of some general principles which govern their 
structure and meaning. As one would expect, such a loose 
formulation of the general problem hardly isolates a single 
plan of attack, but only raises further questions which must 
be answered before theorizing can even begin. Moreover, we 
can distinguish between studies of the grammar and lexi­
cology of individual languages, attempts to develop general
^Cf. Katz, Jerrold, and Fodor, Jerry, "What's Wrong 
With the Philosophy of Language?", Inquiry, Vol. 5 (1962), 
especially Sections III and IV. We are indebted to Katz and 
Fodor for many of the observations in this chapter. 
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principles appropriate to the study of all languages, and 
even more general investigations in semiotics. As well as 
offering an engaging challenge, the extreme complexity of 
the problem invites disagreement and philosophers have 
responded in character. While there certainly is an intimate 
connection between "theories of language" developed on each 
level u. generality, the philosophy of language is much too 
underdeveloped to permit their incorporation into a single 
comprehensive theory. Thus at the present time a unified 
theory of language, or theory of linguistic communication, is 
nothing more than a worthy ideal. The current disputes with­
in the philosophy of language might be regarded as a dialect­
ical stage in the development of such a theory.
Of central importance in contemporary theories is 
the concept of linguistic meaning. This concept has been 
defined in wildly incompatible terms, ranging from extension 
2to abstract entities. Still, it is not entirely obvious 
that an adequate theory must explicitly define meaning at 
all; it may be enough that a theory include rules which 
operate on expressions and generate, for each meaningful 
expression x of a language, a specification of its meaning 
of the form "x means y". In any case, any adequate theory 
will have to provide a systematic procedure for specifying
Cf. Mill, J. S., A System of Logic (London, 1906), 
Bk. I; and Church, Alonzo, "The Neecl "Tor Abstract Entities in 
Semantic Analysis," Proceedings of the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences, Vol. 80 (1551), pp. 100-112.
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meanings whether or not it includes a definition of "meaning".
Subsequent chapters are devoted to a critical 
evaluation of the precision with which the meanings of 
expressions in a language may be specified, and to the 
construction of a systematic procedure for producing such 
specifications on demand. It will be argued that absolute 
precision is unattainable, that meanings are essentially 
amorphous, unless the language incorporates explicit 
postulates that determine which words and expressions are 
synonymous. Thus specifications of meaning within languages 
which do not incorporate such postulates, including natural 
languages, can only be approximate at best. The analysis of 
such languages requires some technique for isolating express­
ions which, although not demonstrable synonymous with some 
given word or expression, are servicable specifications of 
its meaning relative to the concerns of some predetermined 
context.If the proposed technique is adequate, if we can 
in fact devise a formal, systematic framework which 
preserves the inherent vagueness of natural languages, then 
hopefully it represents a significant step toward the 
solution of the general problem--the construction of a
^Some work has already been done in this area. Cf. 
Zadeh, L. A., "Fuzzy Sets," Information and Control, Vol. 8 
(1965), pp. 338-353; Goguen, Joseph A,, Jr., "Categories of 
Fuzzy Sets," (doctoral dissertation), (Ann Arbor, 1969);
Machine, Kenton F., "Vague Predicates," American Philo­
sophical Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1972), pp. 2251233; Aune, Bruce, 
"On an Analytic-Synthetic Distinction," American Philo­
sophical Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1972), pp. 235-242.
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comprehensive theory of linguistic communication--and will 
provide a firm foundation for further research,
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND - POSITIVISM AND 
ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY
Despite the welter of conflicting doctrines it is 
possible to isolate two dominant themes,/* Either it is 
supposed that natural languages are structurally similar in 
certain crucial respects to formal languages of one sort or 
another, or it is supposed that the vagaries of natural 
languages are most profitable explored through detailed 
analyses of the use of individual expressions on particular 
occasions. The former approach is the legacy of logical 
positivism while the latter is the legacy of ordinary 
language philosophy. As often happens, each side’s most 
damaging criticism of the other are substantially correct. 
Neither positivism nor ordinary language philosophy provides 
the equipment needed to construct a genuine theory of 
language based on the available evidence.
Of primary concern to the positivist is the fluent 
speaker’s ability to readily construct and understand 
meaningful, grammatically correct sentences. This ability 
presupposes not only knowing the vocabulary, but also
4The comments in this section run the risk of con­
siderably oversimplifying both positivism and ordinary 
language philosophy, and are directed at no particular philo­
sopher. Nevertheless, the deficiencies inherent in both view­
points deserve careful consideration.
^Cf. Katz, Jerrold, and Fodor, Jerry, op. cit.
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grasping (at least implicitly) the syntactic and semantic 
structure of the language. It is evident that this structure 
must be characterized recursively since the number of correct 
sentences which can be constructed on the basis of a finite 
vocabulary is potentially infinite. Thus the positivist 
attempts an explicit, recursive, theoretical reconstruction 
of those organizing principles which the fluent speaker 
understands implicitly.
Now recursive rules are relatively well-understood 
from studies of formal languages. Formal languages hence 
provide a ready-made tool for modelling the recursive 
features of the organizing principles of a natural language. 
However, as the ordinary language philosopher is quick to 
point out, the choice of a formal language upon which a 
theory is to be based cannot simply be arbitrary. Formal 
languages may be constructed in any number of different ways 
and can possess any desired properties. The resulting 
theory will be adequate, indeed, it will be a theory of the 
natural language in question, only to the extent that the 
structure of the formal language reflects that of the natural 
language.
Unfortunately positivists have been insensitive to 
this condition, but rather have chosen their models on the 
basis of familiarity. As a result, wholly inappropriate 
structural features of the models have been incorporated 
into their theories, One example is particularly relevant. 
Although formal languages can be constructed in any number 
7
of ways, in fact most models for natural languages have been 
based on the logistic system of Principia Mathematica, or 
something similar, whose formation rules are considerably 
simpler than the grammar of even the most primitive natural 
languages. The set of rules which characterizes well-formed­
ness in such bystems constitutes a context-free constituent 
structure grammar. Consequently, theories based on such 
systems cannot begin to cope with the complexities of natural 
languages, in which the rules that characterize sentencehood 
must at least constitute a context-restricted constituent 
structure grammar.
These observations call only for closer consideration 
of the structure of the natural language in choosing an 
appropriate model. The positivist's deeply-seated inclina­
tion to model the grammar and lexicology of natural languages 
on the structure of antecedently known formal languages would 
not be intolerable if the problem were this easy to solve, 
but it is not. Presumably, the function of formal models in 
the study of natural languages is similar to that of fric­
tionless surfaces and ideal gases in the natural sciences: 
idealizations reduce the complexity of the phenomena under 
study and permit their description in terms of simpler laws. 
However, idealizations in the natural sciences are subject to 
strict empirical controls. The scientist is required to
^Cf. Chomsky, Noam, "On the Notion 'Rule of Grammar,1" 
Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics, Vol. 12, 
American Mathematical Society, 1961, p. 9.
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indirectly demonstrate an isomorphic relation between the 
idealization and the phenomena by showing that predictions 
based on the former fall within a calculable margin of error, 
and that this margin of error decreases as actual conditions 
approach the ideal.
The ordinary language philosopher maintains against 
the positivist, and rightly so, that nothing corresponds to 
such empirical controls in the case of a formal language 
regarded as an idealization of a natural language. The 
idealization entails no testable consequences which would 
serve to confirm that the requisite isomorphism obtains. 
For example, suppose that two formal languages, and L7, 
are proposed idealizations of a given natural language L, 
and that some sentence S of L is taken as analytic in 
and synthetic in L2. In order to determine which of and 
L2 is the better idealization of L it would be necessary to 
determine whether S is in fact analytic or synthetic in L.
Unfortunately we have no adequate characterization of 
analyticity for sentences of natural languages,? and thus no 
empirically justifiable grounds for choosing one of the two 
idealizations over the other. Idealizations are illuminating 
in the natural sciences only because enough is known about 
the essential features of the phenomena to permit the 
application of empirical controls but the essential features
?Cf. Quine, W. V., "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," From 
A Logical Point of View (Harvard University Press, 195377 
Section 4.
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of natural languages are too poorly understood to provide 
such controls over linguistic theories based on fully 
articulated formal models. Hence, it is not possible to 
demonstrate the required isomorphism between the structure of 
the model and that of the language under study. In short, 
the positivist is in the unhappy situation of having a good 
deal of sophisticated theoretical machinery ready at hand, 
but too little data to justify its application.
For the ordinary language philosophers, the most 
important feature of natural languages which cannot be 
reflected in the positivist's formal models is the fact that 
the meanings of certain philosophically interesting words 
seem to fluctuate significantly from context to context. 
According to these philosophers the meaning of a word can be 
determined only by a detailed analysis of the way in which it 
is being used. Thus while positivists tend to focus on the 
study of sentence structures and implication, ordinary 
language philosophers are primarily concerned with the study 
of words and word usage in particular interpersonal contexts.
While this approach is commendable in so far as it is 
g 
sensitive to the "open-texturedness" of meanings, it has 
been justly criticized for lacking systematic and theoretical 
orientation. Compiling a complete dictionary for a given 
language would fall far short of giving an adequate
8Cf. Waismann, F., "Verifiability," Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol., XIX.
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theoretical reconstruction. In addition one would need at 
least a complete grammar, and more importantly, a character­
ization of the semantic significance of various grammatical 
forms. The fluent speaker does not ruerely ape the previously 
observed linguistic behavior of others, but can produce and 
understand wholly novel sentences. This ability must rely on 
the operation of recursive rules of some sort which determine 
the grammatical contribution to the meanings of sentences, 
and which cannot be explained within the (necessarily finite) 
lexicon of the language.
Typically, ordinary language philosophers attempt to 
account for the semantic significance of grammatical forms by 
appeals to rules of language: two words are said to have the 
same use only if their employment is governed by the same
9 rules. Unfortunately, no one has ever adequately defined 
what a rule of language is, although many analogies have been 
suggested for what a rule of language is like (a rule of 
language is like a recipe, a rule of logic, a rule of a game 
and so on). Presumably, the explicit formulation of the 
rules which operate implicity in a given language will have 
to be accomplished by a thorough investigation of the various 
ways in which the meanings of words determine the meanings of 
sentences. However, the ordinary language philosopher is in 
the position of having to know the rules first in order to
^Cf. The essays collected in Chappell, V. C,, ed.> 
Ordinary Language (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1964).
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determine the conditions under which given words have the 
same use (meaning), different uses (meanings), more than one 
use (meaning) and so on.
This observation would be no objection at all if the 
"use theory" provided some theoretical constructs in terms of 
which word and sentence meaning could be characterized with­
out employing the notion of a rule of language. One could 
then examine various systematizations of the rules developed 
relative to a number of alternative characterizations, and 
thus arrive at the best systematic description of the 
language's semantic structure. However, because meaning is 
identified with use, and because use is at least partially 
determined by the rules, there is no way to divorce the 
notion of meaning from that of a rule of language within the 
"use theory."
Lacking the constructs necessary for a theoretical 
characterization of meaning, the ordinary language philo­
sopher is forced to resort to his intuitions. That is, while 
he may succeed in developing a theory of sorts, the theory 
will be applicable to particular puzzles only when guided by 
the intuitions of the theorist. This is not to suggest that 
intuitions play no role in the construction cf theories; on 
the contrary, the judicious exercise of intuition serves to 
isolate the class of clear, unproblematic cases which provide 
empirical constraints. Nevertheless, intuitions cannot do 
the job required of well-defined theoretical constructs in a 
fully articulated system. The appeal to intuition is 
12
question-begging in the problematic cases, since these are 
precisely the cases to be settled on theoretical, not 
intuitive grounds.
The primary objection against the two approaches to 
the philosophy of language briefly considered here is that 
both are inescapably aprioristic. The positivist has no 
empirical justification for his choice of a formal model 
while the ordinary language philosopher lacks the theoretical 
constructs needed for a systematic reconstruction of the 
recursive features of sentence formation, Any theory is 
required to account for the available evidence, which in this 
case is the observable linguistic behavior of fluent speakers, 
and positivists and ordinary language philosophers have 
succeeded to a certain extent. Nevertheless, when questions 
arise concerning the adequacy of specific analyses of prob­
lematic cases, the appeal to a formal model or to intuition, 
defended on apriori grounds, prevents an objective evalu­
ation of the degree to which the available evidence supports 
the analysis.
NEW PERSPECTIVES
The apriori character of positivism and ordinary 
language philosophy is largely responsible for the lack of 
consensus in contemporary philosophy of language. This 
suggests that what is needed is a scientixic investigation of 
existing natural languages based on acceptable empirical 
methods. Moreover, to the extent that its methods are 
13
acceptable, current linguistics represents a legitimate 
effort in this direction. The philosophy of language may 
then be seen in the proper perspective as the critical 
analysis of the concepts and methodology of linguistics; that 
is, as a discipline strictly analogous to the philosophy of 
mathematics, the philosophy of science and so on..
Part of the linguist's task is to formulate a 
grammar, or formal system which determines the set of 
sentences of a language together with a structural, descrip­
tion of each. Most importantly, generative (as opposed to 
taxonomic) grammars are genuine theories of sentencehood and 
are open to empirical verification.^® The system will entail 
that a given string of elements in the vocabulary is or is 
not a grammatically correct sentence, and this prediction can f
be experimentally checked. Note that the intuitions of fluent 
speakers serve to determine a class of sentences which are 
unquestionably correct.
This theoretical orientation has encouraged the 
construction of highly sophisticated systems. The inadequacy 
of immediate constituent structure grammars motivated the 
development of transformational grammars, which are capable 
of giving structural descriptions of a much larger class of
^■®Cf. Chomsky, Noam, "Remarks on Noma fixation," 
Readings in English Transformational Grammar, Roderick A. 
Jacobs and Peter S. Rosenbaum, eds., Ginn and Company (1970). 
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sentences.While no one has ever constructed a complete 
grammar for English, for example, there is every reason to 
suppose that further articulation of the theory of trans­
formational grammars will provide the means for Fully 
characterizing the grammatical contribution to the meanings
r. , . 12of English sentences.
A syntactic theory, which identifies the set of 
meaningful sentences, does not completely account for the 
fluent speaker’s mastery of his language. Tn addition a 
semantic theory which describes the connection between word 
meaning and sentence meaning is required. This point has 
been recognized by many linguists but. work on the semantics 
13of natural languages has barely begun. There is, moreover, 
a_ good reason why this should be so. As remarked above, the 
intuitions of fluent speakers concerning the grammatical 
correctness of given sentences provides more or less reliable 
empirical control over the construction of syntactic theories. 
However, nothing corresponds to such empirical control in the 
case of semantic theories.
Perhaps the clearest of our intuitions concerning 
meaning are those of synonymy, and it might be suggested that
For a bibliography of early work in the development 
of transformational grammars, see Chomsky, Noam, ”0n the 
Notion ’Rule of Grammar/” op. cit. , p. 16, footnote 24.
12Cf. Chomsky, Noam, ”P.emarks on Nominalizacicn,” 
op. cit.
l^cf. Chomsky, Noam, "Topics in the Theory of 
Generative Grammar,” Current Trends in Linguistics, Thomas A. 
Sebeok, ed,, Vol. 3 (1966).
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a proposed semantic theory be evaluated by examining the 
pairs of expressions which, according to the theory, are 
synonymous. However, intuitions of synonymy can provide 
genuine empirical controls over the construction of a 
semantic theory only if a class of unquestionable cases can 
be isolated. Nelson Goodman has presented an ingenious
14 argument that there are no unquestionable cases.
Goodman points out that any semantic theory will 
have to describe the ways in which the meanings of complex 
expressions depend upon the meanings of their constituents. 
Consider any two non-identical predicates nA" and "B", the 
complex predicates "description of an A" and "description of 
a B," and the actual ink-inarks which make up an inscription 
of the form "an A which is not a Now this inscription
a
will be part of the extension of "description of an A" but 
not part of the extension of "description of a B," hence the 
two complex predicates cannot have precisely the same 
meaning. Since the transformational derivation of the 
complex predicates from "A" and "B" will be identical, any 
semantic theory will presumably have to account for the 
difference in meaning between the complex predicates on the
^Goodman, Melson, "On Likeness of Meaning," reprint­
ed in Problems and Projects (New York, 1972), pp. 221-230.
15Ibid., p. 227.
l^Note that since "A" and *'B" are non-identical, "an 
A which is not a B" cannot be shown to be contradictory with­
out presupposing that "A" and "B" are synonymous.
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basis of a difference in meaning between ”A" and '’B’\ It 
follows that no two non-identical predicates are exactly, or 
absolutely synonymous.
If Goodman is right, then intuitions of absolute 
synonymy cannot provide empirical controls over the construc­
tion of a semantic theory. This is perhaps not an entirely 
unwanted consequence, since upon reflection it is most 
difficult to produce even a single pair cf non-identical 
expressions which would be counted synonymous by a fluent 
speaker on all occasions. Still, the meaning of "bachelor” 
is surely more like that of "unmarried male” than that of 
"husband,” and this fact should be taken as a piece of 
relevant evidence. In other words, intuitions of likeness of 
meaning, rather than of sameness of meaning, might provide 
the needed empirical controls provided that adequate theoret-
17 ical definitions of the relevant concepts can be devised. 
It remains to be shown how this can be done. The feasibility 
of applying the resulting pragmatic concepts to the investi­
gation of natural languages will then be examined in 
sections seven and eight.
^It should be explicitly noted that Goodman himself 




Since a theory of the semantics of a natural 
language must describe the ways in which meanings of 
sentences depend upon the meanings of the constituent words 
and expressions, one might hope to discover a criterion of 
synonymy by examining the semantic role of various express­
ions in sentences in which they occur. Minimally, if one of 
a pair of synonymous expressions occurs in a sentence then 
replacing that expression by its synonym should not affect 
the truth value of the sentence. Hence it has been 
suggested that if two expressions are interchangeable every­
where salva veritate then they are synonymous.^
As reasonable as this proposal might seem, it. is 
open co a number of objections. For example:
(1) "Bachelor” has eight letters, 
is true, but,
(2) ’’Unmarried male” has eight letters,
is false. This example can be ruled out on the grounds that
^Cf, Mates, Benson, "Synonymity,” Leonard Linsky, ed., 
Semantics and the Philosophy of Language (Urbana, 111., 1952),
17
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the quoted expressions are functioning as names for the 
expressions within the quotes, provided that interchange­
ability within names is excluded from the criterion.
Similar emendations of this sort are required to 
handle other extraordinary constructions. However, it is 
doubtful whether any two non-identical expressions are 
everywhere interchangeable salva vert rate. Suppose the 
following is true:
(3) Jones is in doubt whether a bachelor is an 
unmarried male.
Here, substituting "bachelor" for "unmarried male" will 
surely alter the truth value of the sentence. In fact, 
Nelson Goodman's argument in "On Likeness of Meaning," 
briefly discussed in section three, proceeds by presentin'^ 
an algorithm which produces, for any two non-identical 
expressions, a sentence in which interchangeability breaks 
down.
Moreover, even if Goodman's objections could be 
countered in some way, showing that two expressions are 
interchangeable everywhere salva veritate would not thereby 
show that the two are synonymous. Suppose that a certain 
young woman who desires to be married is conversing with a 
friend, and her friend mentions that he has a brother named 
Joe. Now it is not at all clear that:
^Goodman, Nelson, "On Likeness of Meaning," reprinted 
in Problems and Projects (New York, 1972), p. 256.
(4) Joe is a bachelor,
(5) Joe is an unmarried male.
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have precisely the same meaning. The young woman in question 
might plausibly conclude from (4), but not from (5), that Joe 
is old enough to be married. Indeed, if she knows that her 
friend is aware of her desire to be married, she might even 
construe an utterance of (5) as suggesting (in the manner of 
conversational implicature^) that Joe is not old enough.
One might reply that we are here dealing with 
connotations, not meanings, and that a pair of expressions 
w'hich have the same meaning are synonymous whether or not 
there are differences of connotation. This response can be 
maintained only by showing some clear-cut distinction between 
meaning and connotation, but lacking a semantic theory, we 
have no rules or criteria on which to base such a distinction. 
That is, it cannot be usefully argued that while ”Joe is a 
bachelor" may suggest, it does not imply that Joe is old 
enough to be married. Demonstrating this assertion would 
require at least a minimal logic of sentence meaning without 
which we are free to decide the matter either way. We could 
of course simply draw the line arbitrarily on a case by case 
basis, but this approach would shed no more light on the 
problem than appealing to the dictionary for an explanation 
of synonymy. The point here is just that a division between
^Cf. Grice, H. P., "Logic and Conversation," The 
Logic of Grammar, Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harmon, eds., 
(Encino, California, 1975) pp. 64-74,
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important differences in meaning and unimportant differences, 
viz. connotations, should be the result of a critical analysis 
rather than a starting point.
Nevertheless, recognizing that typically there are. 
differences of meaning which are significant and differences 
which are insignificant points the way to a crucial question: 
is the borderline between significance and insignificance 
the same on all occasions? Plainly, the answer is no; 
significance is relative to context, or the purposes of 
immediate discourse. In most everyday conversations one can 
probably use "ghost" and "spirit" interchangeably without 
radically affecting what is said, but iu a technical discus­
sion of Hegel’s Phenomenology the two cannot be conflated. 
This suggests that the full semantic analysis of a given 
sentence cannot be completed in isolation but must include 
an examination of those aspects of the context that influence 
the way in which the sentence is understood.
A clear explication of "context" could help system­
atize the distinctive interconnections between a number of 
sentences regarded as a piece of coherent discourse and 
provide the means for defining the relation of sameness of 
significant meaning relative to a given context. This 
relation will serve to explain intuitions of synonymy by 
picking out pairs of expressions which have the same 
significant meaning relative to most contexts encountered 
in everyday discourse. The attempt to reconstruct contextual 
influences on meaning in a formal theory preserves the 
21
orcii.nary language philosopher's concern with the details of 
the usage of expressions on particular occasions as well as 
the positivist's concern for systematic orientation. More­
over, since contexts as defined will be experimentally 
verifiable, at least theoretically,^ intuitions of contextual 
synonymy might be capable of providing empirical controls 
over the development of semantic theory.
CONTEXTS
One thing we may say with assurance is that rhe 
concept of context has been more often utilized than analyzed. 
As a starting point, it is clear that contexts, whatever they 
are, give us clues to the interpretation of otherwise 
ambiguous sentences. For example, if our discourse concerns 
the dishes served at a particular dinner, then we might 
interpret "had" in "Mary had a little lamb” as meaning 
roughly "consumed" and "lamb" as a mass term meaning "lamb 
meat." On the other hand, if our discourse concerns the 
inhabitants of Mary's stable then our interpretation of the 
sentence in question will be very different. Presumably, the 
context guides our understanding of an ambiguous sentence by 
circumscribing in some way the possible interpretations on 
which the sentence is relevant. In order to formalize this 
brief exposition, we need definitions of "interpretation" and 
"relevance."
^The practical limitations are briefly discussed in 
Chapter III, see pp. 36*37.
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We propose to define interpretation on the basis of 
the objects which a given sentence says something about, 
and shall adopt the analysis of the relation of aboutness 
developed by Nelson Goodman.Briefly, Goodman sets out 
the following:
(1) An expression will be said to designate 
whatever it refers, or applies to. Which 
parts of a sentence are construed as 
designating will depend upon how the 
sentence is analyzed, but any normal 
analysis of sentences into predicates and 
arguments will be adinitted. The only 
restriction is that an expression which 
designates a class, "the New England 
states'* for example, will not be taken
as designating every, or even any 
particular member of that class.
(2) The generalization of a sentence S with 
respect to an expression E is a formula 
constructed by putting an appropriate 
variable for E everywhere in S and 
prefixing to the result a universal
c
Goodman, Nelson, "About," reprinted in Problems and 
Projects (New York, 1972), pp. 246-272.
^Certain modifications will be required here and 
throughout if we are to countenance nothing but individuals. 
See Goodman, "About," op. cit. Section 8.
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quantifier governing that variable.?
(3) A sentence T will be said to follow differ­
entially from a sentence S with respect to 
an object k if T contains an expression 
designating k and follows logically from
S, while no generalization of T with 
respect to any part of that expression also 
follows logically from S.
With these preliminary concepts in hand, Goodman proposes to 
8 
define absolute aboutness as follows:
(4) A sentence S is absolutely about an object 
k if and only if some sentence T follows
a 
from S differentially with respect to k.
?This definition may seem unnecessary but consider 
Goodman1s example:
(a) Aroostook County grows potatoes.
(b) Everything that is an X and contains Aroostook 
County contains a county that grows potatoes.
Since (b) follows logically from (a) the generalization clause 
is needed to prohibit taking (b) as evidence that (a) is 
absolutely about everything.
8Goodman treats other kinds of aboutness, but 
absolute aboutness is all we shall need for our purposes(
9
We follow Goodman in taking the notion of reference, 
and hence that of absolute aboutness, as context-free in 
general. However, a treatment of indexical words in which 
their reference may be fixed in light of certain features of 
the context is worthy of consideration. 'While this proposal 
will not be explored here, it should be pointed out that the 
further definitions constructed in this chapter do not pre­
suppose a context-free treatment of indexical words. Such a 
treatment would be presupposed only if it could be shown that 
contexts can be formed on the basis of the initial relevance 
of sentences containing indexical words such that (1) the 
reference of the indexical words is not fixed by the assump­
tion of initial relevance, and (2) the reference of the
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According to this definition, the sentence "Crows are 
black" is absolutely about black things as well as absolutely 
about crows. While this result conflicts with conclusions 
drawn by other writers,its advantages in subsequent appli­
cations seem to argue for its correctness. The relation is 
intentionally made independent of shifting psychological 
emphasis and is wholly extensional.
We may not use Goodman’s definition to distinguish 
between the two interpretations of "Mary had a little lamb" 
cited earlier. On the first interpretation the sentence is 
absolutely about the set of things which are pieces of lamb 
meat, while on the second it is absolutely about the set of 
things which are lambs. In short, we may distinguish between 
all and only those interpretations which make an extensional 
difference by identifying the interpretation of a sentence 
with the sets of objects the sentence is about:
Definition I - An interpretation of a sentence
S is a set of objects I such that k £ Is (that 
is, k is a member of Is) if and only if S is 
absolutely about k.
We would like the definition of relevance to be such
indexical words is not fixed extra-contextaally (by ostension, 
for example). At present it does not seem possible that 
contexts can be formed in this way, making a context-dependent 
treatment of indexical words a live option.
l^Cf. Ryle, G. , "About,". Analysis, Vol. 1, pp. 10-11. 
and Putnam, H., "Formalization of the Concept of ’About,*" 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 25, pp. 125-130.
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that the relevance of a sentence precludes certain inter­
pretations and admits others. That is, we need to set out 
conditions which must be met in order for a sentence to be 
relevant on a given interpretation. Tne easiest way to do 
this is to assign to every context a universe of relevant 
discourse Uc. Intuitively speaking, Uc will be the set of 
objects with which discourse within that context is concerned. 
Having arrived at a definition of membership in Uc, we may 
attempt to define relevance in terms of membership in Uc.
However, the matter is not quite so simple since 
contexts are unfortunately quite amorphous. Typically, 
though these are exceptions, we do not settle contextual 
questions in advance of engaging in discourse. Rather, the 
clues to interpretation are picked up in the process of 
understanding how certain key sentences actually are being 
interpreted. On the other hand, grasping the concerns of 
the context requires the recognition that certain key 
sentences are in fact being counted relevant. Moreover, 
contexts may expand, contract, or shift in any number of ways 
during a comparatively short piece of discourse. What we are 
talking about, so to speak, is determined by what we are 
inclined to count as relevant, while conversely what is 
relevant is determined by what we are talking about. Con­
sequently, the definitions of relevance and membership in Uc 
should permit determination of relevance in terms of objects 
antecedently included in Uc and determination of membership 
j.n Uc in terms of sentences antecedently counted relevant.
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Of course this interdependence must be only partial 
if we are to avoid blatantly circular definition. We must 
admit that certain objects are included in Ue, and certain 
sentences are counted relevant, by consensus of those 
engaged in discourse. It is no part of our task to formulate 
a set of rules by which such decisions may be made, nor, we are 
inclined to think, could this be done. It will be enough if 
we can determine relevance and membership in Uc given these 
arbitrary choices.
We may then suppose that a sentence is relevant if it 
is about some member of Uc, but this criterion is not quite 
strong enough. If we desire to determine whether Junes 
smokes, then surely Jones is a member of Lrc. Still, ‘’Jones 
has red hair” and “Jones drives a Ford*’ are both absolutely 
about Jones, but neither assertion is relevant. This 
deficiency can be remedied by requiring all members of a 
sentence’s interpretation to be members of Uc-
However, this alteration makes rhe criterion too 
strong. Again, if we desire to determine whether Jones 
smokes, then “Jones smokes cigarettes" is surely relevant. 
But our criterion would discount this sentence on the grounds 
that the set of cigarettes, which the sentence is absolutely 
about, is not a member of Uc, That rhe sentence should be 
counted relevant is a consequence of the fact that it implies, 
via existential generalization, “'There is something which 
Jones smokes.” We may say that the latter sentence is 
immediately relevant and that the former is relevant in
27
virtue of its implication of the latter, yielding: 
Definition II - A sentence S is immediately 
relevant on an interpretation l's to a context 
with universe of relevant discourse Uc if and 
only if (1) by consensus, S is identified as 
an immediately relevant sentence on Is, or 
(2) k € Is only if k € Uc.^^ 
Definition III - A sentence S is relevant on 
an interpretation Is to a given context if and 
only if (1) S is immediately relevant on I,., 
or (2) S is not a logical contradiction and 
there is some immediately relevant sentence 
T which follows logically from S.
We may now try stipulating membership in the inter­
pretation of a relevant sentence as a sufficient condition 
for membership in Uc. This would include too much, however, 
since for any object we can easily construct a relevant 
sentence which includes that object in its interpretation by 
conjoining a sentence which is absolutely about that object 
with some immediately relevant sentence. However, we do 
need to insure that all objects in the interpretations of all
11It should be noted that no sentence follows differ­
entially with respect to anything from logical contradictions 
and tautologies. Contradictions yield all sentences as con­
sequences while for every consequence a tautology yields, it 
also yields a generalization of that sentence with respect to 
any designating experssion. Hence, contradictions and taut­
ologies are not absolutely about anything and are not relevant 
to any context.
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immediately relevant sentences will be members of Uc. This 
can be done as follows:
Definition IV - An object k is a member of 
the universe of relevant discourse Uc of a 
given context if and only if (1) k is included 
in Uc by consensus, or (2) there is some 
sentence S which is immediately relevant to 
the context on some interpretation Is such 
that k € Ig.
By combining definitions two and four, we may derive 
the desired result as a theorem:
Theorem I; A sentence S is immediately
relevant on an interpretation Is to a context 
with universe of discourse Uc if and only if, 
k 6 Is only if k 6 Uc.
There is one further item which must be considered 
before we conclude our analysis of contexts. A number of 
contemporary philosophers, Donald Davidson for example, 
have held that agreement on the truth-value of a significant 
number of sentences is a necessary condition for linguistic 
communication. Whether or not one finds this claim plausible 
it seems clear that agreement, on at least some sentences is 
necessary for the formation of a context. Otherwise, there
^See Davidson, Donald, "On the Very Idua of a 
Conceptual Scheme,11 Presidential Address delivered before the 
Seventieth Annual Eastern Meeting of the American Philosophi­
cal Association in Atlanta, December 28, 1973,
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could be no meaningful discourse, only endless argument.
Definition V - A background for a given context 
is a set of sentences Bc such that all and only 
sentences which are accepted as true by consensus 
u c » 13are members of Bc.
A background for a given context may include a number 
of conditionals which permit the deduction of an immediately 
relevant sentence T from some sentence which does not satisfy 
Definition III. Since such sentences are clearly relevant, 
we may wish to weaken the criterion by, for example, requir­
ing only ([ S} UBC) =» T.^H We can avoid the unwanted conse­
quence that all sentences accepted as true are relevant by 
adding a second clause, say ~(BC » T). This clause is a bit 
too strong, however, since it would automatically exclude all 
members of Bc. We wish to allow for the possibility that a 
member of Bc might be relevant in the sense that it permits 
the deduction of some immediately relevant sentence which 
could not be deduced from Bc if the sentence in question were 
not a member of Bc. This result can be obtained by weakening 
the second clause and requiring only that the intersection of 
B^ and the complement of the singleton of which the sentence 
in question is the sole member not imply T. We may then 
replace Definition III by:
13cf. Stalnaker, Robert C., "Pragmatics," Semantics of 
Natural Languages, Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harmon, eJs., 
(DordfecTit, Holland, 1972), pp. 387-389.
l^Here, and in that which follows, we need definitions 
of a number of logical and set theoretical notions. We shall 
assume that these notions have been defined in the standard ways.
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Definition III* - A sentence S is relevant on 
an interpretation Ig to a given context with 
background Bc if and only if (1) S is immediately 
relevant on Is, or (2) S is not a logical contra­
diction and there is some immediately relevant 
sentence T such that ( {S} U Bc) T and
"'I ( {$} Cl Bc) * T will te called a 
significant consequence of
CONTEXTUAL SYNONYMY
According to Definition Til1 of the proceeding 
section a sentence is relevaiit to a given context just in 
case it has at least one significant consequence. In 
formulating this notion, we have taken the first step toward 
a logic of meaning and are now in a position to characterize 
sameness of significant meaning relative to some context. 
The relevant assertions which a sentence makes about an 
object are those of its significant consequences which are 
absolutely about that object. For example, if the context 
concerns whether Jones smokes, then ’’Jones smokes cigars” is
lousing "u" for union, “n” for intersection, ”for 
implication, and for complement: see footnote 10. This 
definition is reminiscent of some of C. S. Peirce’s remarks 
on meaning: cf. Collected Papers, C. Hentshorne, P. Weiss, 
and A. W. Burks, eds., (Cambridge, 1931-1958); especially 
volumes V and VIII. In addition, we can explain why the 
substitution of one of a pair of alleged synonyms for the 
other often produces ’’oddity”-- we are no doubt unsure about 
the significant consequences of a sentence such as "It was a 
read pedal extremity race;’’ cf. Dress, J. R. , "Synonymy and 
Oddity," Philosphical Studies, Vol. 23, pp. 269-279. 
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relevant. The one relevant assertion which the sentence makes 
about Jones, moreover, is "There is something which Jones 
smokes,"
Our intuition in section five that such sentences 
differ in meaning only in ways which are irrelevant to the 
given context may now be spelled out in terms of their 
significant consequences. It is neither necessary nor 
possible at this point to define the relationship between a 
sentence and its significant consequences in terms of 
meaning. We need only to establish that any evidence for a 
claim that two sentences differ in ih-eaning in some way which 
is important for the purposes of immediate discourse must be 
found among their implications for the concerns of that 
discourse.
(1) For any two sentences S and T and some 
given context, S and T have rhe same 
significant meaning (or are synonymous) 
relative to that context only if for 
every significant consequence of S there 
is an identical significant consequence 
of T, and for every significant conse­
quence of T there is an identical 
significant consequence of S.
Now on any reasonable account of meaning, if two 
sentences have different logical implications then they 
cannot be synonymous. Since sentences (together with the 
background) do imply their significant consequences, we might 
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say:
(2) For any two sentences S and T and some 
given context, if S and T have the same 
significant meaning ( or arc synonymous) 
relative to that context, then for every 
significant consequence of S there is an 
identical significant consequence of T 
and for every significant consequence 
of T there is ati identical significant 
consequence of S.
These proposals lead, however, to an unwanted 
consequence. If, in the previous example, Jones' first name 
is George, then we would want to say that: "Jones smokes 
cigarettes" and "George smokes cigars" have no significant 
differences in meaning if "Jones smokes cigarettes" and "Jones 
smokes cigars" Jo not. But (2) distinguishes between the 
former pair on the grounds that existential generalination 
yields respectively "There is something which Jones smokes" 
and "There is something which George smokes." If two 
expressions D and E both designate the same object k, we may 
wish to say that an occurrance of D in one sentence and of E 
on a second sentence does not constitute a difference in 
significant meaning. We can weaken (1) and (2) in an appro­
priate way, then combine the results to formulate the following 
definition:
Definition VI - Two sentences S and T are 
synonymous relative to a given context with 
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universe of reLevmit discourse Uc if and only 
if for every object k € Uc and every signi­
ficant consequence P of S which is absolutely 
about k there is a significant consequence 
of T which is identical to P except, at most, 
for the expression designating k, and for 
every object k € Uc and every significant 
consequence Q of T which is absolutely about 
k there is a significant consequence of S 
which is identical to Q except, at most, for 
the expression designating
Having defined contextual synonmy of sentences, we 
can easily define contextual synonmy of expressions:
Definition VII - Two expressions D and E are 
synonymous relative to a given context If and 
only if every pair of sentences S and T, which 
are identical except that S contains D where T 
contains E, are synonymous relative to that 
context.
With respect to highly restricted contexts. 
Definitions VI and VII produce contextually synonymous pairs 
of sentences and expressions which are quite unlike in 
intuitive meaning. However, the pairs which would be 
synonymous relative to a large number of familiar contexts
16Compare this definition with that suggested by 
Bruce Aunc in "On an Analytic-Synthetic Distinction," 
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 9, pp. 235.242. 
34
are just those pairs we would be inclined to say have the same 
meaning on intuitive grounds. We think this fully captures 
what is intended by a claim that two sentences or expressions 
have the same meaning; we are not wrong when we say that 
"bachelor” (on one of its interpretations) and "unmarried 
male" are synonymous, for they will surely be synonymous 
relative to any ordinary context.
The view we are urging here is opposed to that which 
asserts that the meanings of expressions are in some way 
determined extra-contextually, and that certain features of 
particular contexts serve merely to eliminate ambiguity. 
While it is of course true that understanding the meanings cf 
expressions is essential for comprehending a piece of dis­
course it does not follow that meanings are learned extra- 
contextually. On the contrary, learning the meaning of a 
new word is commonly a matter of learning, by example and 
analogy, the contextual usage of sentences in which the 
expression can occur - particularly if the expression in 
question is non-observational and cannot be learned by 
ostension.l? Hence our understanding of the meaning of such 
an expression cannot be divorced from our grasp of the 
significant consequences of sentences in which the expression 
commonly occurs (see section 10)and it is not surprising 
that relative to familiar contexts the set of an expression’s
■^Cf. Quine, W, V. , Word and Object, (Cambridge, 
1960), Chapter I, especially sections5 anJ 4.
contextual synonyms and the set of its intuitive synonyms 
tend to coincide.
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Still, we must conclude with Goodman that no two 
non-identical expressions are absolutely synonymous if 
absolute synonymy is construed as synonymy relative to any 
context whatsoever. Given any two expressions D and E, 
clause (1) of Definition IV allows the construction of a 
context in which X's are members of the universe of relevant 
discourse, and in which "anything that is a D is an X" but 
not "anything that is an E is an X" is a sentence in the back­
ground. Then since "Jones is a D" and "Jones is an E" will 
not be synonymous relative to this context, neither will D and 
E.
This may seem a bit underhanded, and we can sym­
pathize with those who suspect that some sort of restriction 
must be placed on the sentences we may include in the back- 
19 ground for a context. The background for an actual context, 
at any rate, will consist of sentences we really believe to 
be true. Nevertheless, even the firmest of our beliefs are 
not sacred, and cannot therefore serve as the grounds for a 
declaration of absolute synonymy. We have here one more 
demonstration of the interdependence between the meanings of 
our sentences and our beliefs about the world.
l^This argument parallels Goodman's in "On Likeness 
of Meaning," op. cit.
19Cf. Goodman, Nelson, "On Some Differences About: 





The set of contextual synonyms for a given expression 
in a sense^ gives the meaning of that expression insofar as 
it is relevant to the contexts The connection between the 
meaning of an expression and the set of its contextual 
synonyms does not provide an adequate definition of meaning, 
but it does provide an adequate definite oil of meaning 
specification: a specification of the meaning of an expres­
sion X relative to a given context is a nun-identical 
expression Y such that X and Y are contextually synonymous. 
Since the need for meaning specification arises in connection 
with many semantic puzzles, <ne would, expect that the 
application of the concept of contextual synonymy could 
provide a measure of insight into their solution.
One area in which meaning specification is of central 
importance is translation. Ideally, a translation specifies 
the meaning of the expression translated, albeit in a differ­
ent language. Since translation requires a syntactic and 
semantic analysis of the object text, actual translations
1-The import of this qualification will become 
evident in Chapter 4.
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provide a wealth of data for linguistic research. Typically, 
however, practicing experts are much too busy translating to 
take time out to analyze what they are doing and tend to 
regard their task from a purely literary point of view, 
resolving problems that may be encountered in a more or less 
ad hoc fashion. Until recently, the feasibility of applying 
the methods and techniques developed in empirical linguistics 
9 to doing actual translation had not been fully evaluated.
The situation changed radically when the development 
of high-speed electronic computers began generating interest 
in the possibility of machine translation. Acute problems 
were immediately encountered in attempting to write Lhe 
programs required to analyze the object texts.Many of 
these problems have been solved, but some have not. At 
present, machine translations are next to useless without 
extensive post-editing, and with post-editing the process is 
too slow and expensive to compete with human translation/* 
lhe problem, in its most general form, is that no 
procedure for evaluating the acceptability of a translation 
has been forthcoming other than to submit the translation to
^Oettinger, Anthony G., Automatic Language Translation 
(Cambridge, 1960), pp. 110-114.
^Booth, A. Donald, and Locke, V.'illiam N. , eds. , 
Machine Translation of Languages (Cambridge, 1955), p. 2.
^Language and Machines, a report by the A.utomatic 
Language Frocessing Adivsory Committee, Division of Behavorial 
Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, National Research 
Council (Washington, D. C., 1976), p. 24.
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a human post-editor. If such a procedure could be devised, 
translating machines could be programmed to evaluate their 
own output and make appropriate corrections where necessary, 
eliminating much of the need for post-editing. In addition, 
a criterion of acceptability would represent a significant 
contribution toward understanding how the meanings of 
expressions in different languages are related.
First, it should be pointed out that a complete 
translation algorithm for two languages will have to be 
bi-polar; that is, it must consist: of two functions each of 
which maps the sentences of one of the languages into the 
sentences of the other.An artificial example will serve :o 
illustrate this point. Consider two languages, and L7, 
for the porpositional calculus. contains sentential 
variables and the operations of negation (~) and disjunction 
(v) . I.2 contains sentential variables and the operation of 
alternative denial (/). All L| formulas can be translated 
into L2 formulas by defining a function f which maps the 
sentential variables of L| into those of L2 and extending the 
mapping according to the following rules:
f(~X) = f(X)/f(X) 
f(X V Y) = f(X)/f(X)/f(Y)/f(Y)
^Tymoczko, Thomas, "A Note on Translation," The Jour- 
nal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXII, pp. 16-21. I am indebted to 
this paper botn for the observation that translation is bi­
polar as well as for the example.
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Now the inverse of f obviously does not provide a 
translation from I>2 to for there will be an infinite 
number of formulas in L2 (for example, all those in which a 
variable occurs an odd number of times) which are the 
translation of no formula in Lp A second function g is 
required, which maps the sentential variables of L2 into 
those of and extends the mapping as follows:
g(X/Y) - ~g(X) v ~g(Y)
Again, there will be an infinite number of formulas 
in L], which are the translation of no formula in L2. Clearly, 
an Lj^ formula X need not be identical to its retranslation 
f(g(X)),
For example:
P V q y p/p/q/q
p/p/q/q ~(^p v ~p) v -<-q / -q) 
o
In general, a function and its inverse will not serve 
to inter-translate two languages for the propositional cal­
culus unless the languages' definitions of formula, and hence 
the structure of the formulas, are isomorphic. The observa­
tion that translation muse be bi-polar can be extended to the 
case of natural languages, for the sentence structure of two 
natural languages will normally be quite different. We will 
need, say, a German-English translation based on the struc­
ture of German sentences and a corresponding English-German 
translation based on the structure of English sentences.
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Since this is the case, why is it that the functions 
f and g constitute an acceptable translation? The answer, 
quite obviously, is that any formula and its image under 
either f or g will be truth-table equivalent. While nothing 
strictly corresponds to truth-table analysis in the case of 
natural languages, the following proposal is nonetheless 
suggested:
(1) An expression D in one natural language 
is an acceptable translation of an 
expression E in a second natural language 
just in case D and E Lave the same 
meaning.
This proposal can hardly be expected to do. If no 
two non-identical expressions in the same language ever have 
precisely the same meaning, (1) implies that there can be one 
and only one correct translation for a given expression. 
However, the English sentence *'He ordered the students’' could 
plausibly be translated into German either as "Er ordnete die 
Studenten" or as "Er befahl die Studenten" depending on the 
context in which the original appears. In other words, the 
acceptability of a translation depends to a certain extent on 
the original expression's contextual environment, a fact 
evinced by the extreme difficulty of translating poetry. 
Nevertheless, we cannot simply replace "have the same meaning" 
in (1) by "are contextually synonymous," for contextual 
synonymy has been defined only for expressions of the same 
language.
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Returning to our articicial example, it is possible 
to demonstrate that f and g constitute an acceptable trans­
lation without having to resort to truth-tables. Since a 
formula and its image under f and a formula and its image 
under g will be equivalent, a formula and its image under 
either of the composite functions f°g or g°f will also be 
equivalent. That is, it is possible to show that for every 
forumla X of Iq and every formula Y of 1/), 
X = f(g(X)) and Y g(f(Y)).
Natural language translations may be tested in a 
similar way although the procedure will be somewhat more 
complicated since the functions will normally be many-to-many 
rather than one-to-one. Since an expression and its re- 
translations will be expressions of the same language it will 
be possible to determine whether or not they are contextually 
synonymous. For example, which of ‘'Er ordnele die Studenten" 
and “Er befahl die Studenten" is the Letter translation of 
“He ordered the students" can be determined by retranslating 
the German sentences and comparing the results in context with 
the original English sentence. In general:
(2) An expression D in one natural language 
is an acceptable translation of an 
expression E in a second natural language 
if and only if at least one translation 
of D is synonymous with E relative to the 
context in which E occurs.
Moreover, since there is no independent test of the 
adequacy of translations of natural languages corresponding 
to truth-table analysis, acceptability according to (2) is the 
most that can be required.
Theoretically, a translating machine could be 
programmed to check its own output automatically instead of 
referring alternative translations to a post-editor. Even 
so, the practical problems are quite forbidding. Construct­
ing a machine capable of handling a wide variety of contexts 
would require storing an extensive background--an enormous 
amount of information, llhile processing this much infor­
mation and determining the significant consequences of a 
given sentence is not beyond the capabilities of that most 
sophisticated of compucers, the human brain. It is well 
beyond the capabilities of electronic computers. Hence, 
while good machine translations may be obtainable by 
restricting input to certain types of■ unambiguous contexts, 
scientific journals for example, barring a quantum jump in 
computer technology a general-purpose machine translator is 
probably out of the question in the forseeable future.7 
More important philosophically is that if trans­
lations which satisfy (2) are acceptable, then a certain
^Once again we encounter the thesis that meaning and 
belief are interdependent. A machine cannot be programmed 
to accurately translate arbitrary discourse without supplying 
it with an extensive list of what is believed to be true.
^Language and Machines, op.cit., pp. 17-16. 
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amount of credibility accrues to W. V, Quine’s thesis of the 
Q 
indeterminacy of translation. Quine considers the construc­
tion of a "manual” which translates a previously unknown 
foreign language into one's home language. The translations 
of highly observational sentences and certain other features 
of the manual will be dictated by the empirical evidence 
available. Translating the remainder requires what ^uine 
calls analytical hypotheses which (roughly) specify the 
foreign language's grammar and lexicology. Since analytical 
hypotheses exceed anything implicit in the native speaker's 
verbal behavior Quine argues that alternative sets of 
analytical hypotheses could be devised, each of which yields 
translations consistent with the available evidence, but 
which specify mutually incompatible translations of any 
number of highly non-observational senrences. Moreover, he 
argues that none of these can be considered the one "correct" 
set.
It is this last claim that has generated the most 
controversy, particularly since no one has produced a really 
10 convincing example. If two manuals produce incompatible 
translations, A and B, of a given foreign sentence X, since 
the native speakers aru not in the dark as to the meaning of
Q 
Quine, W. V., Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass., 
1960), Chapter 2.
^Ibid., p. 68.
^®Cf. Words and Objections, D. Davidson and J. Hintikka, 
eds., (Dordrecht, 1969)^especially the paper by Chomsky.
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X it would seem that some sort of evidence could be found for 
preferring A or B. Quine argues to the contrary that both 
alternatives could be accomodated by "compensatory variations" 
in analytical hypotheses concerning other locutionsIt is 
not at all clear, however, what such compensatory variations 
would be like.
Translating the home language into the foreign 
language will require a second, quite different manual, so 
specifying the meaning of A and B in the foreign language 
will require the application of this second manual. Moreover, 
for two pairs of manuals, and to produce
translations which satisfy (2), ii is not a necessary 
condition that Mi and M* or M9 and M*, specify similar or 
even compatible translations of a given sentence. Alternative 
translations in one direction can be accomodated by appro­
priate alterations in the manual which translates in the 
other direction. Consequently, if translations which satisfy
(2) are acceptable it should be theoretically possible to 
construct alternative pairs of m, nuals whictt on the whole 
produce acceptable translations, but which specify incompat­
ible translations of any number of non-observational senten­
ces. What is more, if acceptability according to (2) is all 
that can be required of translation manuals, then the choice 
between two pairs of manuals will be wholly arbitrary; as
ii .Quine, op. cit., p. 72.
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Quine puts it, there is no objective matter to be right or 
1 7wrong about.
SENTENCES ABOUT ATTITUDES
Particularly difficult translation problems are posed 
by sentences of the form "He said that . . ."He believes 
that , » "Re hopes that . . ." and so forth, in which 
so-called verbs of propositional attitude occur. Specifying 
the meaning of such a sentence, whether in the same or 
another language, requires determining its significant con­
sequences and hence knowing its logical form. Sentences of 
propositional attitude have, however, stubbornly resisted 
logical analysis.' ' For example, it is tempting to construe 
"believes that" in:
(1) Jones believes that Vienna is the capitol 
of Austria.
as a dyadic relation between Jones on the one hand and
1A"Vienna is the capitol of Austria" on the other. Unfortu­
nately, if the contained sentence is given its usual logical 
form, one should be able to substitute the coextensive 
singlular term "Wien" for "Vienna" without change of truth
12Ibid., p. 73.
13Cf. The Dogic of Grammar, D. Davidson and G. Harmon 
eds., (Encino," Ca. , 19757^ "Chapter 2.
■^Cf. Carnap, R., The Logical Syntax of Language 
(London, 1937), p. 248.
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value. But:
(2) Jones believes that Wien is the capitol
of Austria.
may well be false. In other words, given that Vienna - Wien, 
we wish to countenance the inference from "Vienna is the 
capitol of Austria" to "Wien is the capitol of Austria" but 
block the inference from (1) to (2).
The reason, so the story goes, is that while the 
contained sentences in (1) and (2) are extensionally equi­
valent they may not, for Jones, he intensionally equivalent. 
This move necessitates positing iritensional objects for the 
"believes that" relation which are distinct from the 
sentences by which they are expressed. No theoretical ad­
vantage is to be gained by positing such objects, however, if 
no two non-identical expressions have the same meaning 
(express the same proposition.)./^
A second approach, of which W. b. Quine has proposed 
a variation,is to treat the contained sentence as having 
no logical structure whatsou/er. Quine has devised ingenious 
new primitive forms which exhibit one or more of the crucial
^■^It might be objected that we have reached this 
conclusion precisely because we have refused to apply inten­
tional analysis. However, economy of theoretical ontology is 
as desirable of theories of language as of any other theory, 
and propositions are not to be wanted if their purposes can 
be served in other ways.
IGpuine, op, cit., p. 216; and Quine, W., V,, 
"Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," The Logic of 
Grammar, op. cit., pp. 153-159.
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terms in purely referential positions (i.e., substitution of 
coextensive terms and so forth is permitted) and counts the 
rest of the contained sentence as an immediate constituent of 
a composite general term. Thus Quine's rendering of (1) 
would be:
(3) Jones believes [Vienna is the capitol 
of Austria].I?
where "believes [Vienna is the capitol. of Austria]" is a term 
with no accessible internal structure. Now the undesirable 
inference from (3) to the counterpart of (2), viz.:
(4) Jones believes [Wien is the capitol of 
Austria]
is effectively blocked because substitution is not penult ted 
within the brackets. However, the inference from (3) to 
either of:
(5) Jones believes [Vienna is the capitol city 
of Austria)
(6) Jones believes [Vienna is the Austrian 
capitol)
is also blocked for the same reason. While Quine would no 
doubt defend this result on the grounds that any justifi­
cation of the inference from (1) to "Jones believes that 
Vienna is the Austrian capitol" would have to turn of the
l^This is only one of the alternative renderings 
suggested by Quine, but the objection that will be raised 
against this version applies mutatis mutandis to the others. 
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notion of sameness of meaning, it is nevertheless difficult 
to imagine a situation in which we would not make the 
inference with complete confidence.
The source of the difficulties concerning the logical 
form of sentences of propositional attitude is the fact that 
contextual influences are quite strong. It is a virtue of 
Quine’s analysis that these influences are taken into account, 
to a limited extent, by providing that any of the terms in 
the contained sentence may be exhibited in referential 
position as the situation demands. Quine does not, however, 
explain how the situation determines which terms are to be so 
exhibited.
The idiom of indirect discourse is perhaps the least 
obscure of the porpositional attitude constructions because 
of its obvious connection with direct quotation. Even so, 
Jones might assent to;
(7) Jones said that Venus is an inferior planet, 
but vociferously deny:
(8) Jones said that, the Morning Star is an 
inferior planet;
Thus "said that" in (7) is not straightforwardly analyzable 
as a relation between Jones and "Venus is an inferior planet." 
Nevertheless, we think that Donald Davidson is quite 
right to argue that talk of intensional objects has obscured 
the most obvious and natural interpretation: sentences of 
indirect quotation, like those of direct quotation, are 
simply reports of prior linguistic activity (we may wish to 
49
include written as well as verbal activity). Such report­
ing may of course be accurate or inaccurate, but while direct 
quotation requires a verbatum rendition of the original item 
we as yet have no fixed standard of how far indirect 
quotation may deviate from the direct. Intensional objects 
are not to be wanted for the "said that" relation on this 
score alone, for the problem is not thereby resolved but 
simply recast in new (and more obscure) terms.
Our standard must insure that the repoit does not 
deviate from the original in any way which matters. The 
reporter does not aspire to direct quotation, but claims only 
that his version is "close enough"--that it is synonymous with 
the original relative to the context in which the report is 
made. Thus (7) may be rendered:
(9) <3x) [ (Jones said "x") & (x is synonymous
with "Venus is an inferior planet" relative 
to this context)]^
where "Jones said *x*" is the familiar device of direct 
quotation. Substitution of contextually synonymous 
expressions, and any other transformation which preserves
18 Davidson, D., "On Saying That," The Logic of 
Grammar, op. cic., pp. 143-152.
l^Given the results of the preceeding section we may, 
if we wish, provide for the possibility that the original was 
in another language. (9) would then become: (ax)(ay) I (Jones 
said "x") & (y is an acceptable translation of x) & (y is 
synonymous with "Venus is an inferior planet" relative to this 
context) ]Since this emendation may be made to any of the 
formulations in this section, in the interests of brevity we 
will omit it.
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contextual synonymy, is permitted within the second set of 
quotation marks.
This rendering of (7) leads to a result which may at 
first seem undesirable. Suppose that relative to the context 
in question “Venus" is synonymous with "the Morning Star." 
Then (9) yields:
(10) (3x) [ (Jones said "x") & (x is synonymous 
with "The Morning Star is an inferior 
planet" relative to this context)].
So we may report Jones' statement using (8) rather 
than (7) even though Jones would not concur. We give up the 
notion that an indirect quotation is accurate only if the 
original speaker would certify our report, but the loss is to 
be welcomed. It simply reflects out willingness to paraphrase 
the speaker's original words in ways which might have been 
inappropriate in the original context, but which create no 
confusion for the purposes of the report.
Quite often, we either cannot remember the speaker's 
exact words or are in no position to ascertain whether he 
would object to our paraphrase. Hence, while the locution 
“said that" suggests that a certain psychological attitude 
toward the following sentence is affirmed of the subject, 
the suggestion is clearly misleading. The leeway permitted 
in indirect quotation is, so to speak, for our own benefit, 
and provided that we are sufficiently clear about the 
significant consequences of the original version we are free 
to paraphrase as we see fit.
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Suppose, further, that Jones has explicitly denied 
that the Morning Star is an inferior planet and we report it 
thusly:
(11) (Jx) | (Jones said ’’x") & (x is synonymous 
with "It is not the case that the Morning 
Star is an inferior planet" relative to 
this context)].
The conjunction of (10) and (11) certainly looks 
disturbing; Jones has made two statements which by our lights 
would lead to an explicit contradiction. What does this say 
about Jones* rationality? The answer, of course, is that it 
says nothing. We cannot charge Jones with inconsistency for 
(10) and (11) do not imply:
(12) (3x)f(Jones said "x") & (x is synonymous 
with "The Morning Star is an inferior 
planet and it is not the case that the 
Morning Star is an inferior planet" 
relative to this context)].
The air of paradox disappears when one recalls that 
the original statements and our reports are made within 
distinct contexts. Moreover, the oddity of the conjunction 
of (10) and (11) is just the evidence on which we would be 
inclined to conclude that the two contexts differ in some 
significant respect: we know something that Jones does not, 
or Jones knows something that we do not. The same remark 
applies to oddity resulting from quantifying into sentences
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20of indirect quotation from the outside. Paraphrase can lead 
to confusion, but such is the price paid for the convenience 
of indirect quotation.
Synonymy with the original version relative to the 
context in which the report is made is thus the criterion for 
the accuracy of an indirect quotation, and can be regarded as 
21 an explication of Davidson's notion of '’samesaying.The 
attitude of the original speaker, actual or hypothetical, 
toward the contained sentence is of no consequence; his 
ignorance need not affect our choice of paraphrase. Thus, 
at least as far as indirect discourse is concerned, the title 
of this section is a misnomer.
To the extent that difficulties concerning the logi­
cal. form of belief-sentences parallel those concerning the 
logical form of sentences of indirect discourse, one would 
expect a similar analysis. First, hov/ever, we must settle on 
what it means for a person to believe so-and-so before we can 
hope to understand what it means to say that he believes so- 
and-so. For this purpose, we propose to treat belief as a
22 relation between a psychological subject and a sentence. 
It is true that for the present we can do no better than
90Cf. Quine's Bernard J. Orcutt example; Quine, 
"Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," op, cit., p. 154,
21Ibid., p. 150.
z^Quine has suggested the same treatment; cf. Quine, 
"Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," op. cit., pp. 
158-159.
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characterize the relation in dispositional teims, "is disposed 
to assent to," for example, but this observation has no
direct bearing on the following analysis of belief-sentences. 
The relation will be introduced as primitive and the analysis 
will therefore be neutral between alternative psychological 
or neuro-physiological definitions of the dispositionals.
If (1) is then construed as affirming a relation 
between Jones and "Vienna is the capitol of Austria," drawing 
inferences from (1) to other sentences of the form "Jones 
believes that, . ." is bound to be a dubious business. For 
example, even if we have:
(13) Jones believes that Wien and Vienna are 
the same city,
(2)%still cannot be deduced from (1) and (13) without an 
additional, and no doubt false, premise to the effect that 
the set of Jones1 beliefs is deductively closed. Consequent­
ly, if a belief-sentence is construed as affirming r relation 
then we must, in the manner of direct quotation, tolerate no 
paraphrase. This analogy may be reflected by encasing the 
sentence in quotation marks, rewriting (1) for example as:
(14) Jones believes (is disposed to assent to), 
"Vienna is the capitol of Austria."
What, then, of those occasions when inference such 
as that from (1) to (2) seem legitimate? Since we cannot 
guarantee that the relation affirmed in (14) also holds 
between Jones and "Wien is the capitol of Austria," even if 
we know that (13) is true, under no circumstances can such 
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inferences be countenanced without denying that the relation 
is necessarily preserved. So (2), if asserted on the basis 
of (1), must be understood as reporting, in the manner of 
indirect quotation, the essential content of some other 
sentence to which Jones is disposed to assent. Just what is 
essential will depend, of course, on the context in which the 
report is made. Therefore (2), if asserted on the basis of 
(1), is rendered:
(15) (3x)[ (Jones believes '*x“) & (x and “Wien 
is the capitol of Austria" are synonymous 
relative to this context)], 
where "Jones believes 'x”’ is the analogue of direct 
quotation used in (14). Again, transformations which 
preserve contextual synonymy are permitted within the second 
set of quotation marks.
Thus belief-reporting, like utterance-reporting, is 
analyzable into direct and indirect modes. That written 
English marks the distinction in the latter but not the 
former case is of no consequence. Tn both cases the direct 
mode requires verbatum rendition while the indirect mode 
allows paraphrase. The extent to which the paraphrase may 
differ from the original item is governed by the concerns of 
the context in which the report is made, Moreover, odd 
results obtained by quantifying into such constructions is 
not taken as evidence that the analysis is faulty, but 
rather as evidence that the context of the original and that 
of the report differ in some crucial respect.
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The treatment of indirect quotation and belief- 
sentences will evidently carry over mutatis mutandis to 
sentences in which other verbs of propositional attitude 
occur. Furthermore, it suggests similar treatment of other 
constructions which fail the substitution test, the 
existential generalization test, and so forth, lor example, 
we might define a contextually necessary (or analytic) 
sentence as one which is derivable from a tautology by the 
substitution of contextually synonymous terms. This would 
explain the intuitive reasonableness of:
(16) It is necessary (or analytic) that five 
plus four equals nine.
The intuitive unreasonableness of substituting "the number of 
planets" for "five plus four" in (16) would also be explained, 
for the two will not in general be contextually synonymous.
Chapter 4
RET4ARKS ON THE SEM/XNT1CS OF 
NATURAL LANGUAGES
TOWARD FURTHER RESEARCH
The preceeding eight sections can claim no more than 
to have described the skeletal framework of a theory of the 
semantics of natural languages, but little more could be 
expected. Discovery of linguistic universals, of what the 
semantic structure of families of languages or of all 
languages have in common, on which such a theory would be 
based must await the elaboration of the semantics of 
individual languages. Nevertheless, some promising, areas of 
inquiry are indicated,
First, it will not be possible, to fully explicate the 
concept of implication for natural languages in terms of the 
concept of implication as defined in formal logistic systems. 
From the discussion of sentences of propositional attitude it 
is reasonably clear that a full grammatic description of such 
sentences does not suffice to determine which sentences may 
justifiably be inferred. Hence implication will apparently 
have to be defined'in terms of semantic as well as grammatical 
structure. We were able to use logical implication to define 
significant consequences only because conditionals were 
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included in the background. In principle, these conditionals 
should be replaceable by a direct theoretical connection 
between relevant features of the context and semantic 
structure.
Second, in order to express semantic relations within 
a fully articulated theory it will be necessary to define a 
set of constructs, corresponding to the more familiar grammat­
ical constructs (Noun, Verb, Adjective and so forth), in 
terms of which the semantic structure of sentences can be 
described. This has been done to some extent in attempting 
to program machine translators, although the emphasis has 
been on practical results rather than theoretical adequacy. 
The development of this conceptual apparatus, like that of 
any other theory, should seek to maximize descriptive and 
explanatory power and minimize conceptual complexity.
Third, while formal logistic systems cannot be 
regarded as idealizations of natural languages, concepts and 
techniques developed in the study of formal logics have 
nonetheless contributed significantly to the analysis of 
natural language. Hence the treatment of ”lt is necessary 
that. . .” indicated in section 8 suggests comparing an 
evolving semantic theory against formal model logics. Such 
a comparison could help clarify the semantic structure of 
such sentences.
^Cf. Oettinger, A., Automatic Language Translation 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1960), Chapter 6.
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Fourth, a given piece of discourse often contains 
expressions which are used figuratively or metaphorically. 
The semantic import of metaphorical usage is very poorly 
understood, again witness the difficulty of translating 
poetry, and such usage poses perhaps the greatest obstacle 
to a complete semantic theory. As one might expect, system-
2 atic investigation of metaphor has barely begun. Further 
work in this area, and in subsequent applications to the 
analysis of natural languages, is sorely needed.
THE MEANING OF MIANTMG
The methodology which derives from the eclectic view 
of the philosophy of language described in the first three 
sections places rather severe restrictions on what is admiss- 
able in a semantic theory. We have not availed ourselves of 
the meaning entities, or any of their surrogates, which 
populate many discussions. However, if the set > f an 
expression’s contextual synonyms in a sense gives the meaning 
of an expression (as remarked in section 7), then it seems 
reasonable to ask w’hat is being given; chat is, what are 
meanings?
The question obviously makes sense only if meaning is 
construed as something over and above specifications of 
meaning, as something which contextually synonymous expressions
2Cf. Goodman, Nelson, Languages of Art (New York, 1968), 
pp. 71-98.
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have in common. One possible answer, yielded by Definitions 
VI and VII, is to define the meaning of an expression as the 
set of the significant consequences of the relevant sentences 
in which it occurs. It might be objected,, however, that this 
proposal simply begs the question since determining the 
significant consequences of a sentence presupposes knowing 
its meaning. While it is a bit difficult to ascertain 
precisely what this anticipated objection comes to, one clear 
implication is that the meaning of a sentence is something 
which can be known prior to determining its significant 
consequences. As a result, a theory of meaning would be 
required in addition to a semantic theory which characterises 
specification of meaning.
It is precisely this supposition which has led to the 
wildly divergent theories of meaning glimpsed in section 1. 
Moreover, it is evident that the supposition is quite mis­
guided from the point of view of good scientific methodology. 
Having a theory of something or other requires a pre-theore­
tical characterization of the subject matter, in the way that 
chemical theory, for example, is based on observational 
descriptions of the interaction of chemical compounds. It is 
possible to isolate a class of unquesticaable cases of 
contextual synonymy, and thus provide a -pre-theoretical 
characterization of the subject matter oE semantic theory. 
However, as argued in section 4, it is not possible to 
isolate a class of unquestionable cases of absolute synonymy, 
of sameness of meaning, and we therefore cannot characterize 
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the subject matter of theories of meaning.
Consequently, theories of meaning are not genuine 
theories of anything at all and there is no reason to suppose 
that there is anything lu knowing the meaning of a sentence 
beyond knowing its significant consequences. As Noam Chomsky 
once insightfully observed:
Part of the difficulty with the theory of meaning 
is that '’meaning"* tends to be used as a catch-all term 
to include every aspect of language that we know very 
little about. Insofar as this is correct, we can expect 
various aspects of this theory to be claimed by other 
approaches to language in the course of their 
development.3
We heartily concur.
^Chomsky, N., Syntactic Structures (Gravenhage> 1962),
p. 103.
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